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Resumen 
Este ensayo pretende esbozar un marco general para el análisis de fenómenos semánticos, 
en términos de la distinción entre contextos de "significados ñiertemente encamados" y 
"significados débümente encamados". Se elaboran sugerencias sobre esta distinción 
presentes en los escritos de Wittgenstein, Polanyi, A. Burms y H. De Dijn. Después de 
explicar el lugar de este marco dentro de las teorías contemporáneas acerca del significado 
como relevancia, me concentro sobre la singularización como uno de los aspectos del 
significado fiíertemente encamado. 'Térdidas" de encamación fiíerte reflejan problemas de 
'hypo-singularidad', o 'hyper-singularidad'; al mismo tiempo, ejemplos que se relacionan 
con nombres propios, mdexicales y ntualización muestran que la aparición y desaparición 
de significado expresa una lógica paradójica de reversiones entre lo singular y lo genérico. 
Abstract 
This article attempts to outline a framework for an analysis of phenomena of meaning in 
terms of a distinction between contexts of 'strongly embodied meanings' and contexts of 
' weakly embodied meanings', thus elaborating indications pointing to such a distinction 
in the writings of Wittgenstein, Polanyi, A. Burms and H. De Dijn. Añer accounting for 
the place of this framework within contemporary views conceming meaning-as-relevance, 
I focus on singularization as one aspect of strong embodiment of meanings. 'Losses' of 
strong embodiment reflect problems of 'hypo-singularity' or 'hyper-singularity'; at the 
same time, examples relating to proper ñames, indexicals and ritualization show that 
appearance aní/disappearance of meaning express a paradoxical logic of reversáis between 
the singular snd the generic. 
0. Atouchofmagic 
InBaisers vales, the third part of bis Antoine Doinel cycle, Fran^ois Tmffáut 
explores the real and imaginary amorous experiences of Antoine Doinel as a 
young man. At one time, in the margin of his rather unstable attempts at starting 
a professional career, Antoine gets involved with Fabieime Tabard, the wife of 
the director of the big shoe shop where he is employed. Or rather, Antoine has 
fallen in leve with her, and as the lady is amused (and flattered) by his highly 
labored avances, he manoeuvres himself into an imagined aíFair. Of course, his 
old girl friend Christine (whom he will eventually marry) is troubled by this 
imaginary, or perhaps not so imaginary relationship; she had always remained 
more or less present in Antoine's more real dealings with the world. However, 
Antoine persuades himself of the dullness of Christine's personality, now that 
he is seeing such a sophisticated lady. One night, while shaving, he is standing 
before the mirror, and, facing his own image, he pronounces the ñame of his 
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new leve. To Antoine, the ñame Fabienne Tabard sounds much more refined 
and aristocratic than the 'banal' Christine Darbon. He repeats the ñame of 
Fabieime, tastes it, smells and touches it, making it resonate with the sound of 
his own ñame. As he reitérales and augments the speed of his recitation, the 
sound of the ñames reverberates on the mirror of his susceptible mind. In order 
to make a kind of cmcial test about the affinities or repulsive forces that should 
or should not reign between himself, the woman of the shoe shop, and his 
ordinary girl friend, he engages in a real derwishes' dance of sounds that should 
answer his quest and decide about their fates and his own: Fabienne Tabard / 
Antoine Doinel / Christine Darbon / Fabienne Tabard / Antoine Doinel / 
Christine Darbon / Fabienne Tabard / Antoine Doinel / Christine Darbon /... 
1. Paraphrasability 
What, in fact, do examples of 'weird' uses of linguistic and other symbolic 
expressions, such as the foregoing, exemplify in terms of the possibilities of 
language to convey meanings? In the following, I will attempt to place several 
kinds of examples within a general framework of types of meaiüng. 
In § 531 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, we read: "We 
speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by 
another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it caimot be replaced 
by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different 
sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in 
these positions. (Understanding a poem.)"' 
Let US cali, for brevity, the first mentioned mode of signifying and 
understanding the mode of paraphrasable meaning, the second the mode of 
non-paraphrasable meaning. Nowhere in this section or in the surrounding 
sections does Wittgenstein give any clarifications or examples of what, in linguistic 
meaning, constitutes the paraphrasable. But he does explicitly indícate 
paradigmatic cases of non-paraphrasable meaning: look at art, music and poetry, 
he says. An overly quick line of criticism would mn as follows. Is it not sigiúfícant 
that it is typically in the realm of the aesthetic that we have to look for the non-
paraphrasable? Here, the suspicion is raised that really only aesthetic expression 
and something like (perlocutionary) effect are at stake, with the attached 
suggestion that we are not faced with a phenomenon of meaiúng properly 
speaking: we would not be allowed, then, to put the phenomenon under a common 
denominator with the 'real', i.e., paraphrasable meanings. 
Leaving aside the question what, exactly, Wittgenstein had in mind, the 
notion of what we could cali non-paraphrasable meaning is certainly intended 
' Philosophical Investigations, transí. GEM. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, p. 143f 
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by him as a genuine case of meaning: in § 527, he says that "understanding a 
sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may 
think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence lies nearer than one thinks 
to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme". But the musical 
traits (rythm, tempe, dynamicS...) one would point to in the comparison, do not 
belong to undescribable, unstmctured parameters: they reveal themselves in 
manifest features, subject to highly stmctural treatment. Indeed, the analogy is 
about questions such as "why is just this the pattem of variation in loudness and 
tempo?" And the sameness of rythm alluded to, between a linguistic and a 
musical sentence, indicates that we have something like "the same pattem. 
(One says, 'Don't you see, this is as if a conclusión were being drawn' or 'This 
is as it were a parenthesis', etc.)" (ibid.). So the center of the comparison is 
the notion of pattem, or stmctural form. Thus, if something would account for 
the inclusión, within the sphere of meaning, of the zone of the non-paraphrasable 
in music, art and language alike, it is the presence of form. There is no general 
form of propositions, to be sure, and no general form of expressions within 
other symbolic gemes either, but there is, in general, the presence of pattem or 
form. What should interest us here, is that via this notion of form, there is a 
reference to a common notion of meaning or signification in a more than 
metaphorical sense, and, to that extent, the distinction between two zones or 
aspects of meaning is really a distinction within one domain. 
2. Degrees of embodiment: the framework 
This paper is not an exegesis of Wittgenstein's thought. In the following 
attempt, I use the distinction between the paraphrasable and the non-
paraphrasable as a Leitfaden to a more encompassing feature of meaning, 
both linguistic and nonlinguistic: the degree of what could be called, with a term 
coined by the Louvain philosophers Amold Burms and Hermán De Dijn (and 
inspiredby Wittgenstein and Michael Polanyi), 'embodiment of meanings'.^ By 
hypothesis, the non-paraphrasable will correspond to strong degrees of 
embodiment. The degree of embodiment of the meanings produced in a certain 
context is the cmcial notion for a framework within which to discuss the relations 
between diverse symbohcal practices. Religión, art, literary language, and certain 
^ A. Burms, "The Sound of Words: A Neglected Perspective in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of 
Language", in D.A. Boileau & J.A. Dick (eds.) Tradition and Renewal. Vol. I. Leuven: University 
Press, 1992, p. 167-180. See also A. Burms, "Proper Ñames and Magical Symbols", in Leuvense 
Bijdragen 67(1978), p. 309- 317; and A. Burms & H. De Dijn, De rationaliteit en haar grenzen. 
["Rationality and its Limits."] Leuven/ Assen: Leuven University Press/ van Gorcum, 1986. For 
Polanyi, see M. Polanyi and H. Prosch, Meaning. University of Chicago Press, 1975. Among other 
philosophers having dealt with phenomena that are related to the topic of embodiment of meaning, 
one might mention Merleau-Ponty, Joseph MargoUs, A. Danto, S.K. Langer, ... 
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fragments of ordinary language and practice would be typical contexts of strongly 
embodied mearungs; for the latter fragments, one might think of linguistic practices 
expressing commitments with respect to certain tj^jes of valúes and interests 
(language of tmst, stately language, aesthetic poignancy,...). Contexts of weak 
embodiment, in turn, would be paradigmatically.exemplified by scientific 
discourse, especially designed artificial (formal) or pseudo-natural languages 
(Esperanto, Basic Enghsh), fragments of ordinary language such as used in 
news bulletins and instmction manuals (or more generally: language of 
communication as notification). 
Axes of opposition 
Axes of gradual oppositions between the respective kinds of contexts may 
be described in terms of several (presumably not mutually independent) 
dimensions. I will distinguish between 
(i) the character and degree of singularity of the sign and the object 
signified, with attached questions conceming the possibility of integrating 
the sign/object into global conceptual surroundings; 
(ii) a dimensión oí articulation: the degree of dependence of meanings 
upon the mode of expression chosen, and, cormected with that, their 
"vulnerability' with respect to material changes in the carrier; 
(iii) degrees of attainability through internal or, altematively, extemal 
points ofview, and, closely related, the way meanings inhábil the traditions 
(or types of connections between old and new meanings) they belong to. 
Here, I will examine contexts, mainly, of strongly embodied meanings in 
terms of the first axe of oppositions mentioned: the character of singularity of 
the sign and the object mentioned. My main heuristic guide will be the 
phenomenon of loss of meaning, and the analysis of examples thereof: the ways 
of loss of meaning may give indications about the ways meanings had been 
constituted in the first place.^ 
Before tuming to the peripetias of singularizing meanings, I want to flesh 
out the roughiy indicated firame of analysis of semantic embodiment a bit. So I 
begin by considering two altemative views of the way mainsprings of meaning 
relate to each other; both imply, albeit more implicitly than explictly, a deiüal of 
' One preliminary notice may be in place: In speaking the language of meanings throughout and 
unscrupulously, one should not eo ipso be forced into the scenario of an ontological commitment to 
special entities called 'meanings'. The question as to whether a translation of the terminology 
suggesting a stance of'semantic essentialism' into less committed language may succeed, is leñ open 
here. However, it seems plausible that subsequent locutions suggesting an analysis of the form 'x 
means y' may be spelled out in terms of (circumstantial) locutions possessing a form corresponding 
to speaker's meaning. (Especially when the latter expression is not only read as 'S means (understands) 
y by x\ but also, in a sense to be specified below, 'Sfails to mean (understand)_y by JC'. 
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the view that an interesting opposition (even a gradual one, in terms of degrees 
of embodiment) can be made between contexts of meaningful discourse as ways 
of producing meaning. More precisely, both involve denying that a pecuhar type 
of meaning, which could be termed 'meaning-as-relevance','' could be thought to 
arise in especially significant ways within contexts.of strong embodiment. 
Two Enlightenments 
What, in these views, are the tacit assumptions about the relations between 
the diverse spheres (science, everyday practices, art, ritual and religión) as 
constmctions of meaning? What I have to say in this respect is rather schematic: 
the remarks, needed and sufficient for my purposes, are located on the level of 
ideal types of these views rather than on the level of detailed and diverging 
exemplifications of the ideas concemed. 
In one view, now rapidly antiquating, the interaction between the sources 
and paths of meaning is in fact a one-way traffic. What decides about the tme 
meaning (or meaninglessness) of a unit of signification, is puré objectified 
(scientific or, possibly also, philosophical) analysis. In the case of meaning-as-
relevance in the manifest forms of life, only a detached analysis can show us 
the way firom illusory attachments towards existing practices and modes of 
thinking to their tme explanation and to their revisión. Eventually only those 
practices or practice-fragments that stand the test will survive and will be 
sustained. I will cali this versión and this visión "the Old Enlightenment". 
In a more sophisticated view of symbol and symbol formation, linguistic and 
semiotic meaning are but sediments, into peculiar symbolic systems, of what 
belongs to more encompassing processes, including meaning-as-relevance in 
all forms of life. Yet, all kinds of meanings appear to evolve on one scene as 
quickly shifting metamorphoses of one fluctuating and globalized sigiúfic process. 
From philosophically correct puns, pictures and poems to airy exchanges on 
relevance and religión, from social statement to scientific spirituality, from 
technopia and therapeutic theology to virtual ritual in cyber celebrations, all 
meaning efFects belong to the constmction of the signific world without any 
genre canons or demarcation Unes among its several constituent symbolic 
practices. All semiotic processes are dealt with according to a pluriform/ plural 
but in the end urütarian model (instantaneous meaning globalized), as if a direct 
comparison between all of them as productions of contení by means of symbols 
laid at hand. For instance, according to this model, meanings arising in the context 
of scientific traditions and meanings arising in the context of religious or aesthetic 
traditions, or in the arena of political thought or everyday life, are simply merged 
' Again, I use the term in accordance with the way it is introduced in A. Burms, "The Sound of 
Words", a.c. 
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in the course of a single line of argument. Or rather, it is not clear in the end 
whether the denial of privilege for any form of discourse calis for a choms 
where each point of view is entitled to an equal voice, or, on the contrary, for 
protective belts, immunizing perspectives of diverging symbohc practices from 
even the principled possibility of mutual criticism (presumably because all 
perspectives are equally arbitrary). 
Within such a view, the metaphorical, value-committed and polymorphous nature 
of all meaning creation is recognized, and metaphor, narrative, polysemy and the 
üke are treated as cognitively finitfiíl and even indispensable in any domain of 
symbohc activity. Science, too, is shown to have a human fece, and religión, not just 
theology, appears as an ongoing debate, an argumentative practice. That is to say, 
however, that such moves still allow religious and artistic meanings to be judged by 
the same kind of standards of significance as scientific or, say, political discourse. 
Thus, a nouvelle alliance among science and lifeworld might be just another, more 
sophisticated way of installing the (now enlightened) hegemony of the generalized 
enlightenment stance with respect to all forms of hfe. I will cali this versión "the 
'New' or' Enlightened' Enlightenment". What the two versions of the unitary model 
of meaning and significance have in common, is the idea that meaiúngfijl content is 
created in a roughiy uniform way through all domains. 
Several, mutually diverging (and very interesting) varieties of a suchlike 
view are presented in ways infinitely more subtle than could be suggested here; 
in this and the next subsection, I will take a quick glance at two examples. The 
first will be reviewed now; it is found in one quite peculiar tradition within 
contemporary thought which originated from a cross-fertilization between 
American pragmatism, Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms (as transferred 
by Susanne K. Langer), and analytic philosophy of language in the lineage of 
Nelson Goodman, Israel Scheffler, and Catherine Elgin. There is, in the works 
of these philosophers, a convincing argument to the effect that we need to 
achieve "a broad view of the reference of symbol systems as extending beyond 
language [and science] and encompassing also the arts", we need to recognize 
"the Creative character of symbolism, issuing in those radically plural stmctures 
that shape the subject's worlds".^ Unfortunately, just how 'radically plural' the 
stmctures referred to here would have to be conceived, has never been made clear, 
since that theme aróse in Cassirer's own woric: and indeed, what would be needed 
for a clarifícatíon here, is a thorough reflection on the idea of 'cognitive fimction' 
ascribed by these authors to the field of what we cali stiongly embodied meanings. 
Meaning globalized, meaning neutralized 
In the unitary model of meaning and interpretation, cognition is the central 
' I. Sche£Qer, Symbolic Worlds. Art, science, language, ritual. Cambridge University Press, 1997, p,4. 
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theme. Accordmg to the Old Enlightenment, it is to be equated with informative 
content, which is considered to be the core of whatever carries meaning, The 
meaning of a (linguistic or nonlinguistic) phenomenon is a communicable idea 
or message, which is neutral with respect to the material mode or way it is 
expressed. The expression is identified with the coding of the idea, and message 
and code are conceived as sepárate aspects of the informational unit. 
Accordingly, linguistic meaning is content expressed in such a way that it is apt 
for paraphrase; relevance, intum, is intrinsic insight into the cosmic order, or at 
least pmdential application of vitally useful information. 
A new variant of the Old Enlightenment view is maintained in cogiütive 
science and (mainly 'intemalist') philosophy of mind, and in some varieties of 
philosophies of language, where cognitive content is the core and the result of 
information processing in cognitive systems (human and non-human) in all 
departments of speech and experience, emotions and categories of relevance 
included. Meaning-as-relevance, in that case, is the fitness of a well-adapted 
system of collaborating zones in the individual cognizer, eventually supplemented 
with the well-ñmctioning communication among two or several such systems 
recognizing each other's propositional altitudes as well as the respective aboutness 
of the propositions involved. (Sometimes, in more 'extemalist' variants, the 
interpretation and adjustment of statements and meanings are seen to be the 
object of speakers' and hearers' triangulations). 
Now, if the model of all meaning as neutral and paraphrasable were correct, 
the material constitution or embodiment of meanings would matter little. Actually, 
witting or unwitting proponents of the model could concede that material variations 
in expression affect the psychological or aesthetic effect and efñcacy of the 
message, but the core (the idea itself) remains virtually untouched. The 
expression is not (part of) the meaning itself, after all; it belongs to pragmatics 
(the perlocutionary forcé), or to psychology. At most one could concede that 
(some form of) embodiment is a necessary condition for constituting, and, 
foremost, for communicating meaning. In that versión, it may be an aspect of 
mearúng, but it remains a separable one. The particular embodiment is not 
constitutive for what is being said. Borrowing a metaphor from mathematics, 
meaning is an invariant which is conserved under varying embodiments. The 
model claims that the core of all meaning is production and transfer of 
paraphrasable content: it is the model oí weakly embodied meanings. This is 
a charitable interpretation and designation of a view which, often, comes 
dangerously cióse to a model of merely ¿//̂ embodied meaning. 
In contrast, according to the New Enlightenment, not only is all meaning 
thoroughly embodied, and necessarily so; also, the variegated ways of this 
embodiment are shown. Moreover, there is no ha.rd core of purely cognitive 
content; metaphor, evaluation and emotion are inevitably onmipresent, softening 
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up the allegedly bmtest of facts. We are never in the space of mere literality 
and paraphrasability. There is no such thing as a detached stance, no extemal 
point ofview, no cosmic exile. Every handling of symbols bears the marks of the 
handier; everything is permeated with traces of the human originator of meaning. 
Accordingly, no subjective/objective dichotomy, no fact/ valué gap, no distinction 
between hard sciences and soft humanities (or even arts) are recognized. 
This brings me to a second recent example of the Enlightened Enlightenment 
view; here, interestingly enough, pragmatism has been fused with the very 
wittgensteinian philosophy of forms of life, aptly interpreted as a defense of the 
'manifest image' against (the claims of) the 'scientific image'. In this versión,^ 
all meaning is rooted in the manifest image (or images), so the scope and bearing 
of all claims and criteria are to be measured against the manifest valúes of the 
lifeworld. 
The problem in this versión is, in fact, solely, to see whether it is still possible 
to say anything at all about what renders some forms of meaning and discourse 
less embodied (or more embodied) than other ones. Perhaps the New 
Enlightener's paradigm of meaning should be called something like 'the model 
of even tempered embodiment' (to borrow a musicological expression). We 
are left with no significantly distinct degrees of embodiment, but, at best, one 
continuous spectrum, with metaphor, narrative and valué on one end, and perhaps 
something like described (or constmcted?) physical facts on the other. The 
question (which should be raised by this picture) of degrees of literality, of 
paraphrasability is not addressed. The problem, then, is that the operation of 
softening-up seems to discharge into a sea of signifícations where any distinctions 
one would be tempted to propose are drowned. Whereas in the Old Enlightenment 
view the contamination of degrees of embodiment was conjured by recognizing 
only a zone of objective meanings, here virtually no plurality of types or degrees 
of embodied meanings subsists as a serious object for a philosophical analysis 
(which is paradoxical, at least in the versions propounding a pluralism rooted in 
the priority of the manifest forms of life). 
' As it is developed in the pragmatico-'wittgensteinian' writings of Putnam and, subsequently, in 
arricies by, a.o., J. van Brakel. There is an hesitation about the road to be chosen along this path: shall 
the plurality of forms of life be defended in combination with a thesis of the 'priority of the manifest 
image', or will there merely be a granting of equal rights? Of course, the thesis just mentioned had 
been developed earlier, mainly in the late Husserl's writings. A general priority of meaning-as-
relevance was claimed in the philosophy oí the Lebenswelt, but, already there, this priority was mixed 
with a thesis about the cognitive priority of the manifest form(s?) of life. Unfortunately, it has never 
been convincingly made clear, as far as 1 can see, what the latter, cognitive priority of the manifest 
over the scientific image exactly consists in (except for the reliance of the evaluation of scientific 
claims, and of 'aims' set for science, and ofon epistemic and pragmatic valúes or 'virtues', possessing 
already some vague sense in 'the' manifest image). In particular, the concept of 'the' manifest has 
been extended and moulded to such an extent in the process of establishing the thesis, that the latter 
is virtually emptied of content. 
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What our two models -corresponding to two stages of the Enlightened views 
of meaning and embodiment- have in common, is the denial of (or at least 
indifference towards) the existence of especially strong degrees of embodiment. 
Both versions claim, furthermore, that there is no important difference between 
degrees of embodiment of meanings to be drawn: the two models taken together 
are variants of a broader model oí neutral embodiment of meanings. Rather 
than dwelling on these views, however, I want to propose and develop the 
preliminaries, instead, to an altemative view, restricting my focus, for now, on 
one aspect: singularity in strongly embodied meanings. 
3. Singularization and loss of meaning 
Within each mode and context of meaning, as meanings are produced and 
circulated, the phenomena of momentary or ultímate, partial or total loss of 
meaning are part of the game. Wc are utterly familiar with descriptions, theories, 
ways of talking, icons, symbols and conventions being relinquished or superseded 
by other, rival congeners: old 'forms' pave the way for new ones. But especially 
in the field of strongly embodied meanings, it seems essential that, moreover, 
forms which seemed replete with relevance may appear empty in certain 
circumstances, even if the forms and the circumstances seemed to be of the 
appropriate kind. What is more, without this permanent possibility of meanings 
falling to pieces, "as in a dream in a slumber",^ the very repletion of meanings 
may be inaccessible as well. Without the possible and actual disappearance of 
the seemingly replete meaning in unpredictable situations, the strongly embodied 
meaning might never have been able to appear as such in the first place: its 
strength and ability may be dependent upon the unexpected appearance of its 
disappearance, its ability of being disabled. 
3.1. Focusing on the singular 'points of condensation' 
Another characteristic of contexts of strongly embodied meanings is the 
fact that meaning is much more dependent, here, on concrete or intuitive modes 
of realization than in the case of weak embodiment. A sample of scientific 
discourse may require illustration and other types of intuitive models (such as 
applications, graphs, etc.) to be sure; moreover, imagination and intuition are 
essential in the context of discovery. But these requirements are not, or at least 
not to the same extent, as intrinsic as in contexts where the strongly embodied 
meanings are tooled for their own sake. Strongly embodied meanings have to 
seize us m order to have any point at all. So they can live and survive only if 
they can find a point of application in our own sensibility; and in order to be able 
' Plato, Parménides, 164d. 
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to do so, the signifying unit they belong to, itself needs singular points of 
'anchoring' or embedding. In their material presentation, certain points, 
contingently determined, should become carriers of our attempts to grasp, seize 
and be seized. We must be seized, not by something like the general or abstract 
meaning of the work of art, but by its unique appearance, unique in the way it 
presents itself to us; contingent in its immediate appearance yet convincing us 
• that it could not have been made otherwise. The best way to be persuaded of, 
and impressed by, this character of irreplaceability, this singular and detached 
identity of the work of art (or of any other complex of strongly embodied 
meanings), is actualized in the ability to find details or points of direct impact 
(such as metaphors or peculiar rythm pattems) in the work, which allow us to 
see the whole singular work and its meaning as if it were projected and 
condensed into these even more singular points. 
In a letter of March 24, 1863, Flaubert congratulates Ivan Turgenev on the 
occasion of the appearance in French oíPervaya Lyubov' (First Love (1860)), 
the miniature novel which had just been published in a Turgenev volume entitled 
Nouvelles scénes de la vie rus se ^ In this frame tale, the first-person narrator 
recounts a youthfiíl passion. Flaubert writes: '"As fciír your First Love, I have 
understood it all the better as it properly recounts th© story of one of my most 
intímate friends. [The fi-iend Flaubert refers to is ¿robably no-one else than 
Turgenev, PC. ] All the old romantics (and I, who haive slept with the head on a 
dagger so often, am among them) must be grateful to you for this tale which 
recalls so much of their youth [...] One of your talents is in the invention of 
women ... But, dominating the whole story, no, the whole volume, there are 
these two lines: 'I had no ill feelings whatsoever towards my father. On the 
contrary, to me, he looked magnified, as it were'." (This is the comment the 
first-person narrator makes when recalling his own reaction (as the seventeen 
year-old hero of the story) at the discovery that his father had become the lover 
of the young woman he himself desperately loved.) Flaubert gees on to say: 
"To me, this is of a frightening profundity. Shall it be noticed? I cannot say. But 
for me, it just belongs to the sublime." To Flaubert, the sentence singled out by 
him surely represents both the key to the novel, and an embodiment of the 
perfect sentence, la phrase inchangeable. 
I will cali such particulars, singular points where the meanings are densely 
presentified or intensified, the 'points of condensation' (points of accumulation, 
of attachment) of the meaning embodied in the totality.'° Often the whole of 
' París, Dentu, 1863; traduction H. Delaveau. Besides the novella, the volume comprised the novel 
Nakanune (1860) {On the Eve; French title: Elena). 
' Flaubert, Correspondance. Voi II, p. 313. 
'° H. De Dijn and A. Burms use the notion of 'point of incarnation' or 'point of embedding' 
{verankeringspunt) in this connection. 
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the (non-paraphrasable) meaning, or cmcial aspects of a signifying totalify of 
the kind we are discussing, are 'assumed' or resumed in its condensation points; 
and the way the content expressed in these points represents the work as a 
whole is eminently non-paraphrasable. 
In 1817, one among the many Lieder Schubert composed on poems by 
Goethe was the very simple strophic song Liebhaber in alien Gestallen (D.558) 
(on Goethe's Ich wollt', ich wár ein Fisch). What is Goethe's text about? The 
paraphrasable aspect of the content can be easily summarized: The / of the 
poem imagines himself metamorphosed, in quick succession, in a fish, a horse, 
a cart, an ape, a sheep, etc., all of course the better to offer his good offices to 
his (capricious) beloved. And in the end, he tells her just to take him as he is, or 
leave him. It would be difficult to find a poem more deliberately naive in respect 
of poetic 'content'. But listen to the rythm of the simple Germán words of the 
first strophe: Ich wollt', ich wár ein Fisch/ So hurtig undfrisch;/ Und kamst 
du zu angeln;/Ich würde nicht mangeln./ Ich wollt', ich wár ein Fisch/ So 
hurtig undfrisch. One could say that Goethe was performing an exercise in 
sound and rythm and tempo, ana enjoying it. 
Now, listen to Schubert's song: it is immediately obvious that it adds yet 
another dimensión (or rather, a world) to Goethe's poem. But it would be very 
hard to explain what the song does to change the character of the poem. What 
is especially striking in Liebhaber in alien Gestalten, however, is the way the 
idea of freshness of rythm and tempo is illuminated and embodied, not merely in 
the transposition of paraphrasable content (the quick concatenation of the lover's 
metamorphoses) and literary form into a singular musical form conceived as a 
whole, but in one striking sound repetition and variation such a% frisch/fisch: 
thanks to a combination of melody and rythm (including the piano line in an 
essential way) and phonetics, it strikes the listener in a way (s)he could never 
be stmck by a mere declamation of the poem. 
As it happens to be the case, singularization may gravitate around 
distinguishable and localizable condensation points of the work; but the latter 
may also be scattered throughout the work or context, so as to produce a 
"shattering effect by the accumulation of seemingly unimportant details"." 
Other examples of singularization by focusing on condensation points are 
based on the role of ñames (proper ñames) in the condensation of a certain kind 
of meanings. It is no coincidence that the fragments of literary and ordinary 
language which are apt for the constitution of contexts of strong embodiment, 
are coextensive with contexts where strong effects of indexicalify (in an extended 
sense) play a major role. Those are the places in ordinary as well as in literary 
discourse where indexicals are ineliminable; in the first place, I would point 
" As D. Magarshack commented on Gontcharev's Oblomov (1859) (the work and the character); 
see Encyclopedia Britannica ed. 1967, vol.19:809. 
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here to the indexical aspect of proper ñames. Some philosophically interesting 
aspects indexicals and proper ñames (considered as generalized indexicals) 
display within ordinary linguistic practices are not simply (derived from) logical 
propérties, but are epistemological aspects intertwined with realities of an 
'anthropological' nature. In particular, the behaviour of proper ñames (especially 
ñames of persons) within human practices, may oscillate between a neutral 
(historical, scientific) usage, weakly embodied, where proper ñames fimction 
as mere designators, and the strongly embodied (or 'ritualized') occurrence in 
contexts which highlight evocative forcé. Indexical elements such as proper 
ñames are interesting because of this oscillation between the weakly and the 
strongly embodied. In the argument of a historian, as a míe, proper ñames and 
dates fimction within a kind of^Moj/-coordínate language.'^ This neutral usage 
of proper ñames is also the current practice in ordinary hfe. However, on top of 
this 'coordínate usage', the case of strongly embodied proper naming is also 
essential in a human form of life, thus accounting for a double role proper 
ñames play in a variety of cases. Using personal ñames exclusively in the 
designative mode, especially in the case of personal contacts (as shorthand for 
something like: 'I am now referring to the person named X., and the person 
named X. happens to be you'; or even: '... happens to be the person I am 
speaking to right now'), would no doubt be a symptom of a serious pathology. 
The 'secondary' meaning is essential, in that it must take precedence in at least 
certain circumstances in the life of persons or of groups of people who happen 
to be collectively committed to some person or group or institution. Especially in 
the case of personal ñames, "a ñame becomes attached to ist object to some 
extent and comes to form a part of it", as Michael Polanyi remarked.'^ 
In our 'cover story' Antoine Doinel felt how the rythm and intensify of his 
perception got raised by letting his cultivated affections fiíse with the image of 
his beloved and his self-image, and with the ñames that are their material carriers. 
More generally, it is fair to say that in less fancifiil examples, people are in 
general sensible to the category of meaning we have called 'meaning-as-
relevance'. Without pretending to analyze the notion here, one could notice that 
in a number of cases at least, there is not only a discrepancy between meaning-
as-relevance and informative content (the latter being the cmcial notion in the 
opposite case of weak embodiment); often there is also an inverse proportion 
among both. The experiment carried out by Antoine Doinel, as well as more 
'̂  No historian, however, will seriously consider the possibility that proper ñames and other 
indexicals (in the generalized sense) such as dates, or descriptions containing indexicals, be substituted 
by space-time coordinates in a coordínate language of the physical geometry type (such as in 
carnapian utopia's in the style of the Logical Syntax of Language). 
" "From Perception to Metaphor", in M. Polanyi and H. Prosch, Meaning. University of Chicago 
Press, 1975, p.72. 
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sensible exercises performed by monks and by more common people of diverse 
obediences, consists in sometimes letting go of all informative content. The 
informative content which remains present in the proper ñame of a person is 
reduced to its bare reference to that person (and even that becomes more and 
more doubtñil in the experiment considered here).. In this sense, maximizing 
relevance could require, in a number of cases at least, minimizing the attention 
for (or the distraction by) certain sorts of information. 
Let US now discuss in what ways the play of appearance and disappearance 
of strongly embodied meanings may mortgage such meanings, that is, either 
tum strongly into weakly embodied meanings, or merely make units fimctioning 
within contexts of strong embodiment pointless (in a redeemable or in an 
unredeemable sense). What are the mechanisms involving that kind of loss of 
strongly embodied meaning, that has to do with the characteristic of singularity 
under discussion? I will point to two opposite and complementary ways failures 
of singularization may obtain. 
3.2. Hypo-singularization 
This conglomérate of modes of losing track of strongly embodied meanings 
relates to the ways the latter cease to ñinction as such through a failure to 
properly focus on the concrete material points of condensation. With apologies 
for the barbarisms, one could cali the mechanism 'desingularization' or 'hypo-
singularization' of contexts of singularized meanings. I see two distinct subtypes 
of this mechanism, and I shall cali them respectively 'Fehlleistung' regarding 
singularization points, and 'contamination among degrees of embodiment' 
3.2.1. 'Fehlleistung' 
A first 'method' to lose singularity by hypo-singularization consists in a 
failure to utter or take into account the material element of singularization (the 
sound, the orthography or typeface of words, and especially of ñames) in the 
appropriate way. As we noted, linguistic contexts mled by singularity are often 
contexts where indexicals play a major role. A failure to produce or reproduce 
the proper ñame, especially the personal ñame, appropriately, is experienced as 
interfering with the conditions for creating or maintaining the desired degree of 
embodiment. 
It is obvious (particularly with proper ñames) that lapses of memory, of the pen, 
and foremost, of the tongue, may become memorable sins against singularity. From 
a certain point on, the slur is put upon the misnaming speaker (or writer) rather than 
on the person misnamed. Of those present at the event, who could ever forget the 
acte manqué oí the speaker who, at one conference, introduced 'the famous 
philosopher Davy Donaldsori"} Losses and misfits of singularity are not confined 
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to the role of proper ñames, though. They may be manifest in the range of other 
indexical elements in languages pertaining to segments of ordinaty hfe and of sciaice, 
such as dates. The symbolic nature of the forgotten anniversaty will require some 
'recovering' gesture or other, if the act of forgetting is to be, in tum, forgotten. 
Neither is the phenomenon of loss and misfit confined to indexical elements 
and their role. The singularity may be concentrated in the sound of words or 
sound/idea combinations which are the supports of the (non-paraphrasable) 
meaning of the work of art. In the course of an argument, developed in a book 
by a famous (English-speaking) humanities scholar, we find the author 'quoting' 
from the Auguries oflnnocence, in what may be supposed to be an omamental 
reference, thus: "see[...] heaven in a grain of sand"... To quote from lines such 
as these in such a way becomes a significant thing in itself, albeit not in the way 
intended by the author who was quoting. Indeed, as the author goes on, this 
kind of "seeing [...] is not a trick only poets can accomplish"! 
In Liebhaber in alien Gestalten, there is the inimitable play with the Germán 
-isch sounds, already associated with everything that is frisch in the life of the 
spoken language: you can only say, either you hear it, or you don't. Thus, compare 
the interpretation of the song by an Anglophone singer with one by a 'native 
singer' of Germán: to the sensitive ear, an interpretation which would, in all 
other respects, be admirable, may be heavily diminished by the inadequate 
rendering of the required -(i)sch sound, because the association of ideas stands 
or falls by the associations carried by this sound. 
Within religión, many examples pertain to the sphere of liturgical language. 
The reciting of the wrong liturgical text, or the accurate rendering of a liturgical 
formula in the wrong place, are not mere mistakes; in case the liturgy is still 
strictly and strongly invested with dignity, such failings demand some new ritual 
act or formula in order to rectify the harm and restore proportions in the symbolic 
order of words and things. The ritual fault is restored by superimposing a higher-
level ritual act ofpurification. Moreover, letdowns may occur, not so much inclearcut 
violations of text and gesture, as in the proper sphere of the interpretation (or aesthetics 
of performance) of the gesture: the execution of a rite may suffer of poor 
inspiration or lack in serenity and grace, or other imponderable quasi-aesthetic 
or quasi-moral qualities bound to the singularity either of the detall or of the 
whole act as a unique 'work'. In much the same way as in the performing arts, 
a distinction can be made between, first, the identity and quality of the score, 
second, the correctness in the 'playing' of the score, Eind, third, within the área of 
the performance, the quality ('musicaüty') in the interpretation given to the (correctiy 
played) score. In ritual, analogous questions cormected with respecting or not 
respecting the singular aspects of meaning arise in all these áreas, and the 
violations or mediocrities just mentioned emphasized difficulties with (non-
scoreable or non-scored) aspects of performing a score. 
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3.2.2. Contamination among degrees of embodiment 
TO sum up, one subtype of desingularization or hypo-singularization of the 
strongly embodied consists in missing the point where well-determined singular 
meanings are breaking through, urging to be seized. This may happen either by 
failing to focus on the right singular term (and leaving the intention towards that 
term empty, so to say), or by focusing on the 'wrong' singular, in which case a 
contamination among singularized meanings occurs. 
Another mode of hypo-singularization is not caused by a lack of focus or a 
wrongheaded focus on this or that 'singular' (the singularly singular, so to say), 
but by a lack of focus on the singular as such ('in general'). More precisely, it 
is due to the failure to tune one's expression and intentionality to the appropriate 
degree of embodiment. In that case, another type of contamination comes to 
the fore. If a symbohc expression which, on the basis of its typical characteristics 
of singularization, clearly belongs to the sphere of strongly embodied meaning, 
is, for one reason or another, delivered in one of the languages (or perhaps just 
the tone) of weaker embodiment, the singularity is also well lost. What happens 
here, is a kind of neutralization (rather than a violation), due to a contamination 
of the strongly embodied by the weakly embodied. (Of course, conversely, it 
may also happen that the weakly embodied meaning is delivered in a strongly 
embodied mode; but I will not be concemed with the effects of that kind of 
contamination here.) 
Here too, indexicals and ñames provide ampie exemplification. If instead of 
forgetting personal ñames, we substitute them by PIN-codes, we are in the 
'wrong' realm of embodiment. A father of nine daughters may have trouble 
with lack of memory space for all their ñames (at least as they are to be applied 
to the right items), and he may find himself saddled with a problem of permanent 
Fehlleistung. Suppose, however, he chooses to settle his problem by the 
introduction of numbers (presumably a domain he masters better) in place of 
their ñames. Now he is saddled with contamination of degrees of embodiment 
(and a contamination of a rather high degree, I guess), at least when supposing 
the language of numbers to be weakly embodied (in itself, or perhaps only in its 
application to given zones of experience). It would be a case of drowning by 
numbers, i. e., by the very entities that saved the man from drowning in his initial 
practical problem. Were he to replace the ñames by uniquely defining descriptions, 
a similar problem would arise, to be sure (unless, perhaps, they were poetic 
descriptions). 
More importantly, when taking a paraphrase for a poetic phrase as an 
equivalent for the original, success is guaranteed - if the aim was semantic 
destmction. Here, no confusión or replacement with another phrase of the same 
kind arises, but a replacement with an attempted explanation; and the latter 
must eo ipso belong to a different symbolic register, even in case the explanation 
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deals with the same 'objects' as the original phrase.''' The teacher 'explaining 
the meaning' of a novel to his class, and checking the pupils' ready knowledge 
as with a physics problem, the dating service starting the instmction of its clients 
by means of a textbook course on relations among the sexes; the priests who 
came with the proposal to ratify the sacrament of penance as practiced through 
the channel of the Intemet (typically a médium of weak embodiment): they are 
all in the same predicament in this respect. The point is not to moralize but 
rather to see that contaminations, arising inevitably in mingling contexts, may 
quickly tum in the challenging character of a displacement of contexts for that 
of banalizing techniques and strategies of disposable meaning. 
Furthermore, not only replacements of strongly embodied ways of talking 
by theoretical or empirical-theoretical insights invite misgivings; also the more 
popular attempts at integrating domains so disparate as the scientific, the 
religious and the aesthetic into 'world views' invite a closer look. In the Religión 
Debates of the ninetees, a thirst for global unity, global holism can be felt, which 
cannot be allayed, so it seems, by the more modest local holisms pleading for a 
diversity of meaningfiíl attitudes each operating primarily within their own spheres. 
But while ingredients (insights) of all those domains may interact with each 
other in quite vivid (and unpredictable) ways (compare section 3.3.2. below), 
might it not be the case that such attempted syntheses would end in nothing but 
mere shadows of former science, and parodies of poetry? And again, couldn't 
it be the case that the essential vulnerability of strongly embodied meanmgs is 
not recognized in systems that tend to even out the role of these meanings to 
that of rational or epistemic valúes? On this point, it makes little difference 
whether the adherent of global holism takes a Replacement view of the relation 
between religión and science (in accordance with the Old Enlightenment) or a 
Convergence view, leaving room for a cognitive contribution of the religious 
component of a world view. 
It may be suspected that also gadgets like Penance on the Intemet, and, 
more generally, the cali for new rituals, are most aptly interpreted in light of 
contamination between degrees of embodiment. No doubt, serious problems do 
arise often enough with respect to the fiíture of old ritual forms; nevertheless, 
the attitude of experimental variation, the search for ritual novelty for its own 
" Even if the next line of the poem contained an intemal comment on the original phrase, such an 
intemal comment, the style of which may be deliberately prozaic, would dififer from an extemal 
comment. Indeed, in such a case the nonpoetic style would be a poetic artífice in the service of a 
special literary effect within the poem. And a work of art is separated from the world habitated by 
other, ordinary as well as extraordinary meanings, by the fact that, next to something like a 
'content' or 'story', it contains what M. Polanyi called a 'frame', functioning, precisely, as a 
detachment from the world. Indeed, this separation or detachment is an essential ingredient of the 
singularity of this kind of meanings. See M. Polanyi, "Acceptance of Religión", in M. Polanyi and H. 
Prosch, Meaning. University of Chicago Press, 1975, p.l49f 
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sake, are repudiations of ritual logic altogether. What is being disowned, is the 
insight that ritual calis for a relation to its own acknowledged origins (whether 
real or imaginary), origins which are seen as given, even if subject to ever 
renewed creation (in and through ritual performance) in accordance with a 
specific stmcturing of a time, that is experienced as 'sacred'. This relation 
carmot be replaced by the invention of new forms: such a concocted ritus ex 
machina mistakes the attitude of the designer -the design stance-, the ingenuity 
and excitement of the Rational Artist, for the anchoring of the ritually embodied: 
whenever new forms do arise in ritual contexts,'^ the attendant transgression 
of the existing code is typically designated as a revitalizing retum from the 
degraded state of the present to the original intention. In this respect, ritual and 
art diverge; more precisely, ritual diverges rather considerably from many artistic 
traditions known to us. 
3.3. Hyper-singularization 
The second (and opposite) way of losing track of strong embodiment as 
embodiment in singular meanings is slightly paradoxical. Indeed, one more way 
of failing to properly focus on concrete material points of condensation is by 
focusing too strongly on these singularities. The latter may attract all attention 
on themselves as singularities, and thus fail to fimction as evocative indicators 
of the singularity of the greater aggregate of embodied meanings (such as the 
work of art) they should be participating in. This has to do with the possibility of 
losing the fluency meanings always need to keep, also and especially in the 
realm of the strongly embodied, where the risk of too strong a fixation and 
rigidity is more real than in other áreas of symbolic activity. Attached shifts and 
losses of religious meanings have to do with the dangers of aestheticism, formahsm 
and 'isolationism' (for instance, in the epistemology of religión). I will cali this 
mode of disqualifying singularly embodied meanings hyper-singularization; I 
will briefly deal with some aspects of this phenomenon, as well as with some of 
its paradoxical traits and consequences. 
3.3.1. 'Fehlleistung' reversed 
Hyper-singularization by Fehlleistung can be most clearly exemplified by 
retuming, once again, to the story oí Antoine Doinel. We pick up our hero at 
the very point where we had left him. In the course of his declamation (or 
declaration) in front of the mirror, Antoine gets very dizzy and exhausted, and, 
finally, he stops his experiment in disgust, as moreover, there are, in terms of his 
'cmcial test', no answers coming up. 
" 1. ScheflQer, taking a somewhat more detached point ofview, has recently raised the question as to 
when change in a rite becomes itself changad into change o/a rite. Cf "Ritual Change", in SchefEler, 
o.c, p.151-160. 
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Contrary to a suggestion that might seem to be contained in what has been 
said above on the inverse proportion between relevance and informative content, 
letting go of all cognitive content is clearly not a sufficient condition for reaching 
a maximization of relevance. Surely, a sensibility for stiongly embodied meanings 
at the expense of paraphrasable content may be the only way of giving the 
appropriate kind of relevance a place in people's lives. In the case of Antoine 
Doinel, however, the play of fulfillment and loss was not only uncontrollable, the 
moment of loss was almost predictable: the indefmite repetition of the ñames 
not only acted as a removal of content, it was also bound to destroy the relevance-
meaning that had shortly appeared in and through the recitation. The ñames 
had to lose their significance in the end, if only because they lost their proper 
tone in the sound mix they were drowned in. So, it might be said that there exist 
also cases of drowning by ñames. The 'fetishistic' or magical frequentation 
with proper ñames may become an extreme case of singularization which 
corresponds, in an altemative description, to a ritualization of meanings ordinarily 
functioning on the verge between neutral or weak embodiment and strong 
embodiment. If the strongly embodied use is not properly embedded, it may 
become an element of a type of separation from the world, which, in the usual 
case, is reserved for ritual occasions properly speaking. In such a situation, all 
the risks of repleteness tuming to loss are looming large."' 
As a matter of fact, what ought to be inserted into the course of (personal, 
interpersonal) life, may become a fmal object of interest and fascination, revolving 
around itself, instead of directing the attention from the ñame to the living person 
(at least as much as from the person to the living ñame). Nevertheless, this 
tendency of meanings, and of signs in general, to revolve around in closed 
circuits (think of Husserl's notion of Sinnentleerung, and, related to it, his 
criticism of mere Formelspiele), reveáis an intrinsic possibility of the symbolic 
which can never be prevented from tuming into actuality: the temptation issuing 
from an absorption in the sound of ñames as an illustration of hyper-singularization 
might be considered as nothing but a case of a more general temptation, the 
absorption of meanings in separated circuits becoming aims-in-themselves. But, 
more importantly, in the end, this temptation might tura out not merely to pose a 
threat, but to be a condition of possibility for the appearance of (strongly) 
embodied meaning at all. That is to say, the border between hyper-singularization 
and a proper way of focusing on the condensation point is beyond the power of 
criteria, beyond the decidable. 
" Notice, besides, that the loss suffered by Antoine is, at the same time, the gain that we obtain as 
spectators of his behaviour: the pointlessness into which his originally strongly embodied sound/ 
meanings are falling, is the vehicle for the inimitable spectacle of strongly embodied meanings 
displayed before our eyes (and in our minds, so to say); no weakly embodied meaning constellation 
such as a philosophical commentary could ever equal this single scene from the film. 
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In the realm of the strongly embodied, the tendency towards hyper-
singularization has its modes of appearance in the use of proper ñames, in 
various forms of sterile formalism in art, and in aestheticist ritualism in religión. 
In the practice of ascribing proper ñames (especially in the case of personal 
ñames), there is a natural tendency to single out the.unique individual named by 
attempting to attach a uniquely referring ñame to it, But proper ñames fail, in 
general, to be unique in two ways: by the analogue, in the domain of ñames, of 
synonymy, and by homonymy. Especially in the field of the strongly embodied, 
the attraction exercised by the uniqueness ideal is spontaneously counterbalanced 
by a tendency to use more than one ñame, i.e., to replace or modify the ('officiar) 
ñame by means of one or several ('poetic') ñames or sumames'^ for the person 
referred to (or addressed). This phenomenon of (referential) 'synonymy' does 
not seem to pose a serious threat for the uniqueness claim as we normally 
conceive of it; it is interesting to note, though, that the irreplaceability of the 
strongly embodied ñame is qualified, as it were, by the practice of surrounding 
it by all kinds of sumames. 
What about homonymy? The strain it puts on the singularizing ability of 
ñames could in general be tackled in two ways. The first solution consists in 
recurring to a ñame chain (linking the person to his ancestors, for example). 
This may be practised in a ritual context, or in a context which acquires a 
quasi-ritual character by the very recitation of such a litany. I think that the 
possibility of (theoretically) recurring to a suchlike solution, thus saving the 
singularity of the ñame (and the named), explains part of the attractiveness of a 
causal theory of reference for ñames. Yet, the fact remains that all constituents 
of the chain are made up by elements -'partial' ñames- which are multiply 
referring ('multiply instantiated', if you like). 
The altemative solution would consist in inventing ñames which have no 
actual or even possible referents (at least not in the past and the present) besides 
the individual one thus intends to uniquely ñame. Even supposing the approach 
could exelude application of the ñame to future individuáis, the attempt to 
implement it puts the finger on the real problem of hyper-singularization. The 
insertion of human individuáis in a chain, itself singular in character, of transmitted 
symbolic goods, from the dead through the living to the unbom, is one of the 
fundamental roles the play of ñames has to fiílfíll. So, the invention of a 
completely singular ñame'* is the excisión of the individual out of the social 
links, making the ñame apt for the ridiculo of disfiguring acts practised to 
expropriate it (or to submerge the individual into the nameless community it 
was illusorily raised above). 
" Such ñames may verge on the borderline between proper ñames and descriptions. 
" Put in extreme terms, a uniquely determining and determined coding such as Gódel numbering 
might do. 
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Again, with respect to ritual, overflows of singularity arise quite naturally. 
In certain circumstances, an absolutely formalistic (or rather, legalistic) attitude, 
sticking to the perfection of the score and/or execution of the rite, or stressing 
its inchangeability, may be fatal for the survival of the ritual itself. Relative as 
these matters are with respect to the cultural site of the rite, the fact remains 
that ritual traditions have generally built in limitations on the (necessary) degree 
of rigidity which is otherwise so characteristic for most of them. Most of the 
time, there are, within the rite, blank spaces for improvisation (elucidation, 
exemplification, preaching) or variation (free formulas). Again, considering a 
formal ritual error unredeemable, because of its impropriety as a sin against 
formal requirements, may itself be improper (if, for example, the cohesive and 
conciliatory forcé of ritual is valued). With respect to this question, as with the 
example of a 'fault' in the imponderable área of interpretation of (the correct) 
ritual gesture, one may be reminded of Chesterton's word: "if a thing is worth 
doing, it's worth doing poorly". Here too, perfectionism is a dead end. 
Our concern for the proper writing and pronunciation of our proper ñame; 
our fear oíaflatus vocis or of a fault against the ceremonial étiquette: all such 
phenomena may induce us not only into forgetting or into doing precisely what 
we were afraid of, but, foremost, into pettiness. The phenomenology and 
pathology of pettiness belong to the problem of the capacity to recognize 
proportions between parts (moments, details) as carriers of meanings, and 
surrounding wholes or frameworks of relevance. Such a phenomenology and 
epistemology of pettiness, however, would require, and deserve, a sepárate study. 
3.3.2. Isolationism among degrees of embodiment 
Hyper-singularization threatens singularization in a way which is syTnmetrical 
to the effects of hypo-singularization; just as a phobia of Fehlleistungen may 
compromise the flow of meanings in a way that mirrors the loss caused by 
neglect of condensation points, just so contamination of degrees of embodiment 
has a mirror image. This counteracting forcé is a form oíhosophobia, the fear 
of contamination. The fear, particularly, that differing degrees of embodiment 
may contamínate each other is translated into artificial attempts at keeping all 
contexts of strongly embodied meanings strictly separated from all contexts of 
weakly embodied meanings, and vi ce versa. Such purgation strategies can 
take several forms. In one of them, the stress is on forbidding weakly embodied 
meanings, say scientific contents, to mingle with the Other: they might be infected 
by the effects of being exposed to the subvertive seductions of aesthetic, 
metaphysical and/or religious 'nonsense'. Given our topic, we will concéntrate 
on fears in the opposite direction: the protection and isolation of the strongly 
embodied from the horrors of objectivity. There are desperate attempts to install 
or maintain taboos on contacts that might infect and weaken the strongly 
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embodied by sleeping with (or even glancing at) the enemy, Either science is 
intrinsically destined to perverting mankind, or else it must be presented as 
completely indifferent to the world of strongly embodied meanings. In the latter 
case, a most interesting variant of isolationism (rather than protectionism) may 
arise, which has no need to forbid or fear trangressions of the borders. Indeed, 
in this versión,'' all contacts are allowed since they are unreal, and not even the 
question of a potential conflict or tensión between the corresponding symbolic 
practices and images (the scientific and the manifest image) is thought to ever 
arise: where no convergence between mutually disparate domains exists, 
divergence has no clearly defined sense either. Whereas the normatively 
protective view is based on a threat-view about the weakly embodied, the 
'descriptive' no-contact-view is, basically, a no-threat-view. 
The problem for this versión is, that a revisionary interpretation of all the 
actual conflicts and tensions that have existed, exist, and will exist, imposes 
itself. The description is a radical redescription. All these (seeming) divergences 
(as between science and religión) can only appear as the sophistic conclusions 
or confusions resulting from wrong-headed interpretations of the real bearing 
of the respective practices. Science, then, for example, is neutral in itself; only 
wrong ideas in the heads (or linguistic behaviour) of people may render it 
dangerous to other forms of life. This, however, is a bridge (or a blowing of a 
bridge) too far. The practices of science, and religión, and art, caimot but impress 
themselves, cognitively or otherwise, as particular (clusters of) viewpoints on 
the larger viewpoints, or forms of hfe, that the people hving within these practices, 
and inevitably contaminated by them, are habitating. So, there carmot but arise 
interesting contacts, conflicts, and questions of consistency among science, art, 
and religión. 
What is right about no-threat-views, is that any comparison that could be 
made between symbolic practices, could at most be indirect. There can be no 
direct comparison of contents across the proper frameworks, because something 
stronger than the nowadays rationally bounded, decontaminated vefsions^° of 
incommensurability stands in the way of such a comparison: the very notion of 
content cannot, in the case of the strongly embodied, mean what it means in 
the case of the weakly embodied. Even if the difference between degrees of 
embodiment is a matter only of degree, the fact remains that, since 
paraphrasability was taken as an index of degree of embodiment, the highly 
non-paraphrasable cannot be dealt with according to a notion of content which 
" Here, one could think of some versions of neo-wittgensteinianism, in general as well as specifically 
in the field of religious epistemology (B.R. Tilghman, D.Z. Phillips, ...), convincing as they may be 
in other respects. 
" Such as T.S. Kuhn's late taxonomic definitíon of (pragmatically rational) incommensurability. 
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is parasitic on the paraphrasable (high degree of translatability, etc.). Thus, the 
confrontation is necessarily indirect. Nevertheless, it is real: as the ingredients 
of symbolic practices inevitably shift in meaning while paving their way to the 
more encompassing images and life forms people live by, they also inevitably 
mix up in formations where it is virtually impossible to disentangle authentically 
represented meanings from misrepresentations. No doubt, scientific (for instance, 
evolutionary) explanations are to be distinguished from elements of a manifest 
understanding of life; nevertheless, as scientific explanations of a certain type 
become more and more influential, they cannot be withheld from themselves 
becoming a way of understanding and interpreting (life, for instance), and thus 
the relations with other ways of understanding inevitably get tense. 
For example, the view a religious person, or a nonreligious person, may 
have of love as a peculiar possibility to be, at least partially, realized or approximated 
in human life, is not by itself incompatible with whatever kind of scientific 
statement to the effect that there is a hormonal, an evolutionary, etc. basis for 
the phenomenon called love. (In order to be clear about what the view of this 
person means, we may of course require that he or she is able to evidence such 
a view, and such a possibility, in more detailed ways.) Now suppose that someone 
else says that the phenomenon we used to cali love is nothing but an 
epiphenomenon of all those determinants possessing characteristics that differ 
profoundly from typical characteristics we formerly agreed to ascribe to love. 
The first interlocutor will protest, and rightly so. Perhaps one may defend the 
view of love as an aesthetically sound and thus self-justifying illusion, backed 
by evolution. But there will arise a conflict, not open to redescription, as soon as 
one is confronted with a situation where the evolutionary explanation and 
interpretation is unambiguously pushing in the direction forbidden by the 
requirements of love (as we understood it before). It is not the idea of love 
which acts as a final cause, to be sure, but the expenenced requirement (and 
conflict) which induces some kind of an idea of love. In this and related ways, 
threats will also inevitably arise; but the fact that they do arise should not be 
seen as a threat, or as an alibi for isolationism. In fact, all that is required to 
maintain the coexistence along with the sui generis character of the strongly 
and the weakly embodied, is the recognition that problems of indirect 
inconsistency may arise, and that some ways out are excuses. If there were 
simply no links (e.g., of opposition) between the understanding of strongly 
embodied meanings and knowledge, the average eliminative materialista' would 
" The example of the eliminative materialist is an extreme example, it might be objected. The 
above example, however, shows that a very closely related kind of conflict would arise with more 
commonpiace reductioníst accounts of different sorts. (I leave open the question what would happen 
when confronted with various other positions on the relations between scientific and manifest 
images). 
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completely misunderstand his own position when he claimed to undermine the 
manifest self-image of man. In this case, we would never be obliged to take the 
position of our adversary (or rather, the person who misdecribes hhnself as our 
adversary) seriously, because it would always be open to our non-confiísed, 
antiseptic redescriptions he himself was not aware of in his confusión. 
On the other hand, when the eliminativist has told his story, our religious 
person in the above example will be convinced that, if that is the picture, 
something must have been left out of the picture. This, then, is the tmth of the 
no-threat-view: if'something' has been left out of the picture, it will, as a míe, 
be something else than an extra-element. It will, in general, belong to a different 
order than the order of theories. So, the tme no-threat-view must be second-
order: there is no threat issuing from the view that science can pose threats to 
the strongly embodied. Speaking in slogans: the 'global meaning holist' (in the 
model of 'neutral embodiment' discussed in see. 2) can see no reason why the 
comment one picture issues upon another would differ from either a direct 
criticism or a confirmation, and thus carmot recognize the proper validity of the 
different pictures; the 'local holist', on the other hand, stressing the primordial 
contribution of meanings to the symbolic practice they belong to, could avoid 
the pitfalls of isolationism, provided that (s)he allows links between the pictures 
or practices, and that these links are thought of as something less (and, at the 
same time, something more) than logical links. 
4. Concluding paradoxes 
The net result of isolationism and protectionism would be paradoxical, if it 
succeeded. If there were no real relations between the strongly embodied and 
the other spheres of symbolic activity (or if these relations were proscribed), a 
dilemma would result. Either there would be no proper interest in the contexts 
of strongly embodied meanings beyond the islands of activity they develop in 
the ocean of symbolic activities in life. There are indeed conceptions of religión, 
for instance, and of religious ritual, where it is stressed that the sacred and the 
profane are strictly separated. There are analogous conceptions of art. (For 
moral practice, it may become vety difficult to maintain conceptions of the 
sort.) Or else, there are conceptions, on the other end of the spectrum, which 
stress that the whole of life should become ritualized or sacralized, or again, 
aestheticized. In this case, either the profane is denied a sphere and radius of its 
own right, or else, it has to be completely penetrated by the other pele of the 
meaning generating practices. 
The first branch of the dilemma seems to fit the strategies of isolationism, 
while the second seems rather to embrace protectionism. The point is that, in 
the same way that both opposite practical attitudes issued from related starting 
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points, they both converge in the end as well, as fer as the suppression of singularity 
is concemed (the protection of which they were so concemed about). Indeed, 
when strongly embodied meanings become thoroughly esotenc, they tend to 
degenerate into aesthetic relies, or end with the status of specialisms, the very 
sort of thing they could not aspire to be. When, on the other hand, strongly 
embodied meanings pervade the whole of life, at the same time degrading the 
whole cogno-technological surroundings we live by to a handy apparatus to be 
relied on blindly, their whole point oímarking, oí signposting the rythms of life 
gets lost. The totalitarian character the singularly strongly embodied acquires, 
paradoxically kills its singularity, lacking as it does the challenge of the Other. ̂ ^ 
(It should be noticed that, in this respect, the artist and the priest are not in the 
same position as the ordinary participant in artistic or religious practices.) 
In the same way, in hyper-singularization of the Fehlleistung variety, the 
net result is the end of singularized meanings. Moreover, in these paradoxical 
results, hyper-singularization converges with its opposite, hypo-singularization: 
both antagonistic forces may collaborate to disqualify strongly embodied meanings 
as such. To see this, let us take a look at a phenomenon in the field of philosophical 
psychology; it is a common phenomenon in certain types of intímate personal 
relationships, relations with the concrete other, given in his concretely embodied 
meaning (to use the right word in the right place). P. Moyaert has called this 
phenomenon "the paradox of individualization": "Bodily details, individualizing 
the other and lending him a face of his own, are always at the same time the 
mark of the anonymous shade of the other. The closer the contact strives to be, 
the closer one gets to the point where the other is no longer distinguishable from 
the others."" 
This kind of absorption of the utterly singular into the general or the generic, 
neutralizing the strongly embodied, was what singularization was destined to 
flee. What if the hypertrophy of the fixed condensation point and the fear of 
contaminated embodiment result in the same dissolution of the meaning-cartying 
element, a dissolution, noticed equally in hypo-singularization, into the environment 
of congeneric elements? 
The beauty spot, the slight asymmetry, may save a face from perfection, -
from submersion into 'general beauty'. But the stain preserves its healing forcé 
" Don Cupitt unwittingly provides a contemporary example: "to be religious means that one's whole 
life is as it were subject to a constant scrutiny and under assessment from an absoluto point ofview 
that silently records eveything and misses nothing. The religious requirement extends to one's whole 
life and to every detail of one's life. It does not allow one to keep any secret compartment or locked 
doors. It searches the heart." "The Meaning of God", in id., Taking Leave ofGod, London, S.C.M. 
Press, 1980, p.85. 
" P. Moyaert, "Mysticism and Love", in J. Walgrave & P. Moyaert, Mysticism and Love, Leuven, 
Universitaire Pers, 1988, p.200. 
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to the extent only that it is not studied under a mental microscope, being stared 
at without surcease. Only as it is obliquely perceived, the object of a passing 
look, does it manage to conjure the danger of, itself, relapsing in the status of an 
exemplar of a natural kind (in this case, the beauty spot, as one of a kind). 
There is more to it than mere annihilation and loss, however. On the 
undecidable borderline between the hypo-singular and the hyper-singular, this 
paradox arises in such a way, as Moyaert suggests, that the most singular and 
the most anonymous pass into each other in a play without which meaning 
would no more appear than disappear. 
The paradox has been cinematographically studied for the case of the erotic 
relationship m Eric Rohmer's Le genou de Claire (1970), the fifth of the Six 
contes moraux. In this modem, yet less cynical variation on the theme of the 
liaisons dangereuses, Jéróme (.Jéróme/Rohmer"^) is on holiday, for the last 
time, at the former parental home bordering the lake of Annecy. He is being 
offered a major part in a slightly Mephistophelean plot. A friend, a female 
writer, Aurora, is laboriously devising a scheme for her new novel. After a 
display of faint resistance, Jéróme is easily convinced by her tempting request 
to try out his appeal on the young Laura (while, at the same time, Aurora is 
taxing his proclaimed impassibility). But, determined to reinvent the plot as well 
as to surprise his accomplice and 'director' Aurora (and himself), Jéróme finally 
tums to Laura's sister, Claire, as the object of his interest. He is disturbed by 
certain details in Claire's appearance. But atthe same time, there is no escaping 
the conclusión that the completely singular condensation point he is after, is at 
the same time a replaceable correlate of a generic desire incapable of reaching 
out for the irreplaceable. "Je me disais que dans toute femme, ily a un point 
le plus vulnerable ... Pour les unes, c 'est la naissance du cou, . . . la taille, 
les mains, ... pour Claire, -dans cette position, dans cet éclairage- c 'était 
le genou. C 'était le póle magnétique de mon désir, le point précis oü, s 'il 
m 'était permis de suivre ce désir et de ne suivre que lui, j 'aurais d 'abord 
place ma main." The supreme task, the conquest and exorcism will simply 
consist, henceforth, in this gesture, to be performed by him, but not without her 
consent: touching Claire's knee. In fact, what is constantly touched and explored 
are undecidable borderlines: borders where the morally impermissible touches 
the morally imperative; borders between the arousal and the excisión of desire; 
the very borders between the themselves unclearly bordered zones of real and 
feigned desire. The opportunity for the final conquest will present itself, Jéróme 
having been an unwitting and silent witness to a secret and dubious meeting 
Claire's boyfriend had with another girl. Indeed, as he reports his vicissitudes 
on the border of the borders to Aurora, in view of her dossier, Jéróme recounts 
how he has exploited his privileged knowledge of the situation to 'make certain 
No. 109 ABRIL 1999 27 
PAUL CORTOIS 
things clear' to Claire ("// a fallu que je lui ouvre les yeux"): after bringing 
Claire to the borders of the lake, he had told her everything he had seen; she 
had been sitting there, gently Ctying, "en face de moi, une jambe allongée, 
I 'autre pliée, le genou aigu, étroit, lisse, fragüe, a ma portee, a la portee 
de ma main... Mon bras était place de telle faqon que je n 'avais qu 'a 
I 'étendre pour toucher son genou. Or, toucher son genou était la chose la 
plus extravagante, la seule a ne pas faire, et en méme temps la plus facile... 
C 'est la seule foi.s que j 'ai jamáis accompli un acte de volonté puré... La 
precisión de mon geste a prévenu sa riposte... Le geste que j 'avais pris 
pour un geste de désir, elle I'a pris, elle, pour un geste de consolation. 
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